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SYMPOSIUM:
 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE
 
CLOSELY HELD FIRM 35 YEARS
 
AFTER WILKES V. SPRINGSIDE
 
NURSING HOME
 
FOREWORD 
RENÉ REICH-GRAEFE* 
On October 15, 2010—exactly fifty-nine years to the day after 
the opening of the original nursing home operation in 19511 which 
formed the core business asset of the closely held Springside Nurs­
ing Home, Inc. corporation—the Western New England College 
School of Law and School of Business2 jointly hosted their 2010 
* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. 
LL.B., Free University of Berlin School of Law, 1996.  LL.M., University of Connecti­
cut School of Law, 1997.  I am indebted to Eric Gouvin—Professor of Law and Direc­
tor of the Law and Business Center for Advancing Entrepreneurship at the Western 
New England College School of Law and, as always, the organizational force behind the 
Symposium—for giving me the opportunity to write this Foreword. I have also received 
helpful comments and support from Barbara Noah for which I am grateful.  All errors 
are mine. 
1. See Eric J. Gouvin, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.: The Backstory, 
33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 269, (2011). 
2. Western New England University School of Law is the only Massachusetts law 
school located outside the Greater Boston area which is fully accredited by the Ameri­
can Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools. The School of 
Business at Western New England College is one of three business schools in Massa­
chusetts outside the Greater Boston area to be accredited by the Association to Ad­
vance Collegiate Schools of Business. 
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Academic Conference on “Fiduciary Duties in the Closely Held 
Business 35 Years after Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home.”  As 
with installments from prior years, the Conference was sponsored 
by the Western New England College Law and Business Center for 
Advancing Entrepreneurship.3  This Issue of the Western New En­
gland Law Review documents the papers which were presented at 
the Symposium. 
I. WILKES’S  ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATED 
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. was handed down by 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on August 20, 1976.4  Its 
enduring legacy and continuing appeal (as well as that of its pio­
neering precursor, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New En­
gland, Inc., decided by the same court on May 2, 1975)5 comes as no 
surprise—at least, to us who are blessed with the benefit of hind­
sight.  The decision simply had all of the right ingredients for pur­
poses of jurisprudential longevity.6 
For one thing, Donahue and Wilkes both straddled (and val­
iantly zeroed in on) the most evasive fault line which our American 
law of business organizations has attempted to draw for the better 
part of the last one hundred years.7  Looked at in tandem, the deci­
3. The Western New England College Law and Business Center for Advancing 
Entrepreneurship offers students real-world, hands-on opportunities to apply, expand, 
and refine their knowledge and skills in entrepreneurship and business development. 
The Law and Business Center’s overall goal is to educate legal and business profession­
als, and its two main operational objectives are (i) to provide legal and business coun­
seling for entrepreneurs; and (ii) to sponsor local educational events focused on 
entrepreneurship and economic development.  The flagship program of the Law and 
Business Center is the Small Business Clinic which has been in operation for more than 
seven years and has provided legal and business advice to over 150 businesses during 
such time.  In addition to its annual academic conference, the Law and Business Center 
also hosts a series of workshops on entrepreneurship topics as well as a speaker series 
where nationally recognized guest lecturers with expertise in entrepreneurship, small 
business, and economic development present on current issues. 
4. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
5. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 
(Mass. 1975).  In this Issue, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc. will 
hereinafter be cited as Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. 
6. Cf. Robert B. Thompson, Allocating the Roles for Contracts and Judges in the 
Closely Held Firm, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 369 n.1 (2011) and accompanying text. 
7. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546, 548 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) 
(“Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise continues, 
the duty of the finest loyalty. . . .  Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the 
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. . . .  Salmon had put himself in a posi­
tion in which thought of self was to be renounced, however hard the abnegation. . . . For 
him and for those like him the rule of undivided loyalty is relentless and supreme.” 
249 
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sions gave immediate and sustained momentum to our intellectual 
inquiry and debate about the context, reach, alignment, and proper 
application of fiduciary duties within the law of closely held 
firms8—and, thus, arguably helped to fill Bayless Manning’s “tow­
ering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and 
containing nothing but wind”9 in an instant. 
In addition, Wilkes also continued and succeeded where Dona-
hue left off in danger of becoming conceptually stuck.10  It confined 
the abstract normative and, perhaps, even poetic beauty of a broad, 
overarching fiduciary duty among co-shareholders of a closely held 
corporation, grounded in concepts of loyalty and equality as pre­
(emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted)); cf. Robert B. Thompson, The Story of 
Meinhard v. Salmon: Fiduciary Duty’s Punctilio, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 105, 105 
(J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009) (stating that Meinhard v. Salmon “after eight decades still 
defines our thinking about fiduciary duty, the most important issue in the law of busi­
ness associations”). But see UNIF. P’SHIP  ACT § 404(b) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001) 
(“A partner’s duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is limited to the 
following . . . .” (emphasis added)); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(e), 6 U.L.A. 143 (“A part­
ner does not violate a duty or obligation under this [Act] or under the partnership 
agreement merely because the partner’s conduct furthers the partner’s own interest.” 
(alteration in original)). 
8. Cf. Douglas K. Moll, Of Donahue and Fiduciary Duty: Much Ado About . . . ?, 
33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 471 (2011) (“[I]t is beyond debate that Donahue helped to 
spark an evolution in the law of fiduciary duty in closely held corporations . . . .”); Larry 
E. Ribstein, Close Corporation Remedies and the Evolution of the Closely Held Firm, 33 
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 536 (2011) (“The most significant changes in the law of business 
associations over the last thirty years relate to small firms.”). 
9. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank 
Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962) (famously conveying his sentiment of listless­
ness by stating that “corporat[e] law, as a field of intellectual effort, is dead in the 
United States” and equating “our great empty corporation statutes” to the metaphor 
above); see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise on Corporate Law: 
Filling Manning’s Empty Towers, 31 J. CORP. L. 599, 599 (2006); see also Lyman P.Q. 
Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006) 
(stating that corporate law scholarship was “[v]irtually nontheoretical until the mid­
1970s”); Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern Corpo­
ration, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 763 (2006) (stating that after the Berle-Means era, “corpora­
tion law scholarship, if not ‘dead,’ was certainly viewed as an intellectual backwater”); 
Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 923 
(1984) (finding that “[u]ntil recently, corporate law has been an uninspiring field for 
research even to some of its most astute students”). 
10. Cf. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 
1976) (“[W]e are concerned that untempered application of the strict good faith stan­
dard enunciated in Donahue to cases such as the one before us will result in the imposi­
tion of limitations on legitimate action by the controlling group in a close corporation 
which will unduly hamper its effectiveness in managing the corporation in the best in­
terests of all concerned.”). 
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scribed by Donahue,11 and distilled such abstract beauty into a con­
crete, yet flexible, tripartite balancing test12 which—with its relative 
ease of application for entrepreneurs, attorneys and judges alike— 
provided much needed pre-investment predictability for the resolu­
tion of post-investment majority-minority agency conflicts among 
the closely held firm’s owners.13  In doing so, Wilkes v. Springside 
Nursing Home, Inc. developed—for the first time—an immensely 
practicable analytical framework and solution to the long neglected 
problem of intershareholder opportunism in the law of the closely 
held corporation.  In other words, Wilkes succeeded in imparting 
much needed fresh air14 into the stale, circular, abstract, and often 
11. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515, 518 (Mass. 1975) 
(“Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close corporation to the partnership, 
the trust and confidence which are essential to this scale and manner of enterprise, and 
the inherent danger to minority interests in the close corporation, we hold that stock­
holders in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty 
in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another. . . . When the 
corporation reacquiring its own stock is a close corporation, the purchase is subject to 
the additional requirement, in the light of our holding in this opinion, that the stock­
holders, who, as directors or controlling stockholders, caused the corporation to enter 
into the stock purchase agreement, must have acted with the utmost good faith and 
loyalty to the other stockholders.  To meet this test, if the stockholder whose shares 
were purchased was a member of the controlling group, the controlling stockholders 
must cause the corporation to offer each stockholder an equal opportunity to sell a 
ratable number of his shares to the corporation at an identical price.” (emphasis added) 
(internal footnotes omitted)); cf. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 547 (“The very fact that Salmon 
was in control with exclusive powers of direction charged him the more obviously with 
the duty of disclosure, since only through disclosure could opportunity be equalized. . . . 
Loyalty and comradeship are not so easily abjured.” (emphasis added)). 
12. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663-64 (“It is an inescapable conclusion from all the 
evidence that the action of the majority stockholders here was a designed ‘freeze out’ 
. . . It must be asked whether the controlling group can demonstrate a legitimate busi­
ness purpose for its action. . . .  When an asserted business purpose for their action is 
advanced by the majority, however, we think it is open to minority stockholders to 
demonstrate that the same legitimate objective could have been achieved through an 
alternative course of action less harmful to the minority’s interest.”).  One can add a 
fourth part to the balancing test where the “court[ ] must weigh the legitimate business 
purpose, if any, against the practicability of a less harmful alternative.” Id. at 663; see, 
e.g., Lyman Johnson, Enduring Equity in the Close Corporation, 33 W. NEW  ENG. L. 
REV. 313 (2011) (“Wilkes sought to cabin the broad duty laid out in Donahue . . . 
through a structured four-step framework.”). 
13. Cf. Deborah A. DeMott, Investing in Work: Wilkes as an Employment Law 
Case, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 497 (2011) (describing how the doctrine of employment 
at-will as a default may be particularly prevalent as a standard fallback for employment 
of the founder-shareholders in the closely held corporation and, thus, may be an “espe­
cially sticky” default, “because putting an alternative on the agenda for discussion re­
quires imagining how one’s co-founders may discover and indulge their dark sides at 
some indeterminate time in the future”). 
14. Cf. Hein K ̈otz, The Role of the Judge in the Court-Room: The Common Law 
and Civil Law Compared, 1987 J. S. AFR. L. 35, 42 (describing how lawyers from Euro­
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cryptic jurisprudential principle that managing business co-own­
ers—in their individual relationships vis-à-vis each other as well as 
vis-à-vis the business as a whole—were to be held to nothing less 
than “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”15 
As each of the following nine articles in this Issue addresses in 
greater and more elegant detail, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing 
Home, Inc. is all about defining the fundamental, yet, evasive fault 
line of corporate law—namely, the line (however gray and diffuse it 
may be) that distinguishes between legitimate and non-legitimate 
forms of personal greed and self-interest (or, more euphemistically, 
of wealth maximization) as well as between legitimate and non-le­
gitimate (ab)uses of intra-firm power (or, again, more euphemisti­
cally, of corporate control and governance). For Justice Cardozo, 
there never was a fault line to begin with. Joint entrepreneurial 
activity was typified by a sanctity of the common interest (or of 
joint greed) underlying the business venture.16  No singular per­
sonal interest could be permitted by the law to control unless it was 
congruent with (or, at least, complementary to) the overriding com­
mon interest and objective.17  From Cardozo’s perspective, the ac­
tuation of personal interests equated with selfish and, thus, disloyal 
behavior per se.  Only behavior in the furtherance of the common 
interest satisfied loyalty.  Figure 1 describes such perspective 
schematically. 
The problem with this bright-line, black-and-white-only ap­
proach of a fiduciary duty of absolute loyalty18 is, of course, that it 
is inherently circular in a multi-principal business. There is no a 
priori common interest—a summum bonum which the law could 
pean Continental legal systems often “feel[ ] like being submerged in an oxygen bath” 
when reading certain judicial opinions by common law judges). 
15. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546. 
16. A sanctity which to Justice Cardozo even appears tantamount to the vows of 
marriage. See id. at 546 (“For each [of Meinhard and Salmon] the venture had its 
phases of fair weather and of foul. The two were in it jointly, for better or for worse.” 
(emphasis added)). 
17. Id. at 548 (“Equity refuses to confine within the bounds of classified transac­
tions its precept of a loyalty that is undivided and unselfish. . . .  [T]he rule of undivided 
loyalty is relentless and supreme.”). 
18. Similar superlatives are regularly used when courts hold that closely held firm 
participants owe each other finest loyalty and utmost good faith.  Note that “utmost” 
could even be called a “super-superlative.” See id. at 546 (“finest loyalty”); id. at 551 
(utmost good faith); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 (Mass. 
1975) (“utmost good faith and loyalty”); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 
N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976) (same).  Apparently, regular “run-of-the-mill” loyalty and 
good faith (whatever they may be) are not good enough. 
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FIGURE 1: LOYALTY A LA MEINHARD`
personal interest 
= 
selfish per se 
= 
disloyal 
common interest 
= 
non-selfish per se 
= 
loyal 
easily recognize under any and all circumstances.  Any “common 
good”—however defined—is always subject to, and solely the result 
of, a majoritarian preference at any given particular point in time. 
And such majoritarian preference may turn out to be exactly the 
opportunistic position or action taken by the majority19 in a closely 
held firm—as long as it is sufficiently clothed in legitimacy (or is, in 
other words, deemed “loyal”).  Even the very same people may 
have different opinions at different times under different circum­
stances as to whether their identical behavior will either constitute 
“loyal” or “disloyal” conduct.20  Thus, loyalty—the lodestar of 
proper investor behavior in closely held firms—turns out to be ine­
luctably relative.  Its guidance starts to vary.  And when a lodestar 
19. The term “majority” as used herein is not only limited to (static, i.e., numeri­
cal) majority ownership of the business entity in question (and the majoritarian control 
rights usually, but not always, flowing from such majority ownership) but also includes 
all other exercises of majoritarian control which stem from (dynamic) de facto control 
mechanisms.  Thus, for example, a shareholder owning only a minority of a closely held 
corporation’s outstanding stock can still be a de facto, ad-hoc “majority” under certain 
scenarios through the exercise of contractually secured veto rights, through a strong 
familial relationship over other shareholders, etc. See, e.g., Smith v. Atlantic Proper­
ties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 801-02 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (“[C]ases may arise in which, in 
a close corporation, majority stockholders may ask protection from a minority stock­
holder . . . [, where the control given to the minority shareholder through a de facto 
control mechanism] may have substantially the effect of reversing the usual roles of the 
majority and the minority shareholders . . . [, and where the] minority . . . becomes an 
ad hoc controlling interest.”). 
20. Such broad statement can be supported anecdotally by reminding ourselves 
that Walter J. Salmon, the very losing party before the New York Court of Appeals in 
Meinhard v. Salmon, felt so grateful in the economically challenging years following the 
decision (which forced him to continue his venture with Meinhard but also gave him 
continued access to Meinhard’s capital) that he sent Justice Cardozo a bouquet of flow­
ers on each anniversary of the opinion. See, e.g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Mein-
hard v. Salmon and the Economics of Honor, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 137, 144 n.11 
(1999).  In other words, greed “opportunizes” man. 
253 
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rises in different positions of the sky night after night,21 it eventu­
ally becomes just another star (with any of its former guidance now 
fully dissipated).  Likewise, loyalty’s overall behavior-guiding value 
for resolving agency conflicts in the closely held firm—as a mere 
abstract, normative concept not solidly linked to a descriptive “op­
erating manual”—is severely diminished and often non-existent. 
However, in 1976, Wilkes finally managed to link loyalty to such a 
solid operating manual. 
It may be argued, today, that the law of business organizations 
recognizes that greed is a universal human condition and that cer­
tain exercises of selfishness are not only rightful, they are beneficial 
to both the individuals exercising selfishness as well as to society as 
a whole.  Or to state it differently: certain instances of selfishness 
transcend into the common good.  The interest of the part and the 
interest of the whole cannot be entirely divorced from each other. 
Cardozo’s opinion for the majority in Meinhard v. Salmon simply 
could not (or did not want to) embrace such an a priori unsettled 
state of relativity between the interest spheres of the common ven­
ture and its constituent parts.  Rather, Justice Cardozo was looking 
for a universal and absolute principle in order to prescribe intra­
firm standards of conduct. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. very 
much followed such tradition (and, in prescribing a similar universal 
and absolute principle—equal opportunity—equally ended up 
overshooting the mark).22 Donahue attempted to recognize both 
economic equality as well as entrepreneurial liberty.  Obviously, 
both of these positions (or objectives of a corporate law system) are 
ultimately mutually exclusive—we cannot have more of the former 
without less of the latter, and vice versa.  Accordingly, corporate 
law must be charged with developing an efficient framework that (i) 
assists firm participants in finding an optimal equilibrium between 
those two positions (thereby, inherently, recognizing both equality 
and liberty of such firm participants), and (ii) in the absence of such 
an equilibrium being sufficiently (pre-)arranged among firm partici­
pants through contracting, provides a balancing of interests—for 
example, through the mechanism of the delictual23 fiduciary obliga­
tions of loyalty and good faith. 
21. For example, when the star in our Northern Hemisphere toward which the 
axis of the earth points (the so-called North Star or polestar) would no longer rise in the 
North. 
22. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 (Mass. 1975). 
23. Fiduciary duties are traditionally seen as delictual obligations, i.e., their 
breach resonates in tort, not in contract. Compare, e.g., ENEA v. Superior Court, 34 
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Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.—for the first time— 
boldly acknowledged both the logical conundrum of a “peaceful co­
existence” of self-interest and loyalty as well as the inevitably resul­
tant balancing required among the same: 
[W]e are concerned that untempered application of the strict 
good faith standard enunciated in Donahue to cases such as the one 
before us will result in the imposition of limitations on legitimate 
action by the controlling group in a close corporation which will 
unduly hamper its effectiveness in managing the corporation in the 
best interests of all concerned. The majority, concededly, have cer­
tain rights to what has been termed “selfish ownership” in the cor­
poration which should be balanced against the concept of their 
fiduciary obligation to the minority.24 
Wilkes recognized that the two interest spheres which Justice 
Cardozo had so fervently attempted to keep separate from each 
other (as described in Figure 1 supra) indeed collapsed into one 
another: the realms of loyal behavior and selfish behavior actually 
blend into each other in a fluid, seamless fashion so that it is impos­
sible for the law to define—a priori and with generality—where 
one ends and the other begins.25  Indeed, under certain circum­
stances, they must be identical and one of the same.26  In other 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 519 (2005) (describing fiduciary duties as “delictual” duties “imposed 
by law” and that “their breach sounds in tort” (emphasis omitted)); Deborah A. De-
Mott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 887, 
with Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 244 
(2009) (“All fiduciary relationships are, at some level, contractual.”); id. at 270-71 
(“Even though all fiduciary relationships are contractual, not all contractual relation­
ships are fiduciary.”). 
24. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976) 
(“[T]he controlling group in a close corporation must have some room to maneuver in 
establishing the business policy of the corporation.”); see also Symposium, The Close 
Corporation, 52 NW. U. L. REV. 345, 396 (1957) (“The concept of a ‘selfish fiduciary’ is 
a contradiction in terms. . . .  The application of the term ‘fiduciary’ to the majority’s 
duty towards the minority is of little value because of the difficulty of reconciling the 
majority’s trust obligation with his right of selfish ownership.”). This symposium issue 
of the Northwestern University Law Review is quoted four times for authoritative sup­
port in Wilkes. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 662-63. 
25. Cf. Benjamin Means, The Vacuity of Wilkes, 33 W. NEW  ENG. L. REV. 433 
(2011) (“The values of efficient governance and shareholder loyalty conflict . . . .”). 
26. Otherwise, shareholder voting in a closely held corporation or partner voting 
in a general partnership would always have to be unanimous.  Any form of dissenting 
from the majority would always be, ipso facto, disloyal by the minority.  At the same 
time, any consensus reached through mere majorities would be equally disloyal by the 
majority.  Consensus would always be required in its narrowest literal meaning, i.e., 
unanimity.  Thus, it must be safe to assume that if shareholders vote in a closely held 
corporation (and, similarly, if partners vote in a general partnership), they are entitled 
and unrestricted to vote in their respective personal self-interests in the vast majority of 
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words, loyalty and selfishness, as the result of a dialectic process, 
not only overlap; they create a synthesis—a hybrid sphere—in 
which selfish behavior must also be loyal behavior, and vice versa. 
Figure 2 schematically describes this “genius”27 of Wilkes in the 
form of a Venn Diagram. 
FIGURE 2: LOYALTY A LA WILKES`
personal interest 
= 
wrongful exercise of 
selfish ownership 
= 
disloyal 
common interest 
= 
non-selfish per se 
= 
loyal 
personal interest
 
=
 
rightful exercise of selfish ownership
 
=
 
loyal
 
The dotted line in Figure 2 further signifies the most evasive 
fault line in our American law of business organizations that ini­
tially was described above.28  To its right, business owners in the 
closely held firm have unrestricted access to the levers of 
majoritarian power for the best interest of the whole even if their 
exercise of such power also results in a (possible) detriment to the 
interests of the minority.29  Or to put it differently: here, the major­
ity simply self-legitimizes its interests qua constituting, and acting 
as, a majority.  To its left, however, the exercise of majoritarian 
power is illegitimate because it destroys the very incentives for indi­
viduals to collectivize entrepreneurial activity.  Or, again, to put it 
differently: here, we simply do not want to permit the majority’s 
cases.  Their (possible) disagreement over what is—for each of them individually—the 
best way to proceed within the common business venture cannot, per se, mean that they 
are all disloyal to each other. 
27. Cf. Daniel S. Kleinberger, Donahue’s Fils Aı̂né: Reflections on Wilkes and the 
Legitimate Rights of Selfish Ownership, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 405 (2011). 
28. See supra text accompanying notes 7 and 16. R 
29. See supra text accompanying note 24. R 
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greed to undermine and, ultimately, destroy its very objective of 
economic wealth maximization (and the resultant societal benefits 
thereof).30 
II. THE CONTRIBUTIONS CELEBRATING WILKES 
The number and quality of the articles in this Symposium Issue 
of the Western New England Law Review demonstrate the enduring 
contribution and appeal of the judicial masterpiece which is Wilkes 
v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.  For purposes of introduction, it 
appears helpful to consider the articles in two separate categories: 
ambience and legacy.31 
The first group of articles (Eric Gouvin, Lyman Johnson, Mark 
Loewenstein, and Robert Thompson)32 meticulously situates 
Wilkes and its underlying dispute within the larger ambience of its 
environment and time—namely, the specific circumstances of the 
formation and operation of, and the developing conflict within, the 
Springside Nursing Home, Inc. corporation; the diverse and 
(maybe, too) disparate backgrounds and personal affairs of the cor­
poration’s founders and eventually litigating principals; the larger 
economic backdrop of a rapidly changing, ever professionalizing, 
high-growth “industry” in the nursing home and elder care services 
sector; the intricacies of litigating a rather novel legal theory in a 
judicial system that still functionally segregated into courts of law 
and courts of equity; the fortune of an activist high court “headed 
by judges with strong progressive philosophies generated by their 
30. I should caution that the schematic view presented in Figure 2 can be mislead­
ing in one crucial respect: in the reality of closely held firms, the overlap area in my 
Venn Diagram can extend significantly into the circle of common interest and non-
selfish behavior on the right.  It may even be argued that, under normal circumstances, 
the overlap area will fill most of the remaining, non-overlap area within the right circle. 
Furthermore, by way of comparison, it also seems necessary to point out that, for pur­
poses of proportion, the overlap area will be significantly larger in size in real life than 
each of the two non-overlap areas individually.  One could even argue that the non­
overlap areas in both circles only include “fringe” behavior and that, therefore, the 
overlap area is the empirical norm as far as the (opportunistic) behavior of equity par­
ticipants in closely held firms is concerned. 
31. In fairness, the line between ambience and legacy is, of course, artificial and, 
at best, blurry (probably even another Venn Diagram situation).  Each of the articles in 
this Issue—either by necessity or choice—discusses elements of both.  It is only their 
respective main focuses by which I mean to distinguish them for purposes of 
introduction. 
32. This first set of articles correlates with the first two panels at the Conference. 
Hon. William Simons, David Martel, & Eric Gouvin, Panel 1: Wilkes v. Springside Nurs­
ing Home: The Backstory (Oct. 15, 2010); Lyman Johnson, Mark Loewenstein, & Rob­
ert B. Thompson, Panel 2: Putting Wilkes into Context (Oct. 15, 2010). 
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life experiences;”33 and the robust academic interest, investigation, 
and discussion of the minority shareholder’s plight in the closely 
held corporation, together with elaborately developed calls for judi­
cially-crafted remedies in order to alleviate such plight, for more 
than two decades preceding the decision. 
Eric Gouvin’s immaculately researched account of Wilkes v. 
Springside Nursing Home, Inc.: The Backstory34 starts us out with a 
“truism” in the law of business organizations. We spend a lot of 
judicial, legislative, and academic effort in order to explain, under­
stand, and properly regulate these aggregations of investors which 
economists simply and conveniently refer to as “firms” (thus, avoid­
ing the difficult task left to the law to translate such “firm-ishness”35 
into legally recognized constructs).  However, ultimately, the law of 
business organizations is always about the people, the real flesh­
blood-and-bone human actors from whom everything else is de­
rived.  In vividly bringing to life the human characters and their re­
lationships which lie beneath the legal dispute, Gouvin reminds us 
that (thankfully) “[h]omo sapiens is not merely homo 
economicus.”36  By furnishing us with a unique insight into how dif­
ferently (if not, asymmetrically) the principals of Springside Nurs­
ing Home, Inc. were situated—including, for example, their 
disparate educational backgrounds and respective statures within 
the community, their divergent (active-passive/insider-outsider) 
roles within the business venture, and (perhaps, most importantly) 
their dissimilar expectations and need for personal income derived 
from their company—Professor Gouvin emphasizes the intricate 
equilibrium which exists between scrupulous opportunism of firm 
investors on the one hand and a necessary, ameliorative moral/ethi­
cal/normative “code of conduct” of entrepreneurs on the other 
hand, all of which is imperative for purposes of overall firm cohe­
sion and survival.  In other words, Gouvin opens the stage by re­
33. Mark J. Loewenstein, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.: An Historical 
Perspective, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 339 (2011). 
34. Gouvin, supra note 1. R 
35. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 601, 621 (2006). 
36. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 932 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“Del­
aware law should not be based on a reductionist view of human nature that simplifies 
human motivations on the lines of the least sophisticated notions of the law and eco­
nomics movement. Homo sapiens is not merely homo economicus.  We may be thank­
ful that an array of other motivations exist that influence human behavior; not all are 
any better than greed or avarice, think of envy, to name just one.  But also think of 
motives like love, friendship, and collegiality, think of those among us who direct their 
behavior as best they can on a guiding creed or set of moral values.”). 
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minding us that the law always takes second place.37  If we want to 
make the closely held firm work, we need to make the human rela­
tionships that constitute the firm work (out) in the first place. 
Lyman Johnson’s article, Enduring Equity in the Close Corpo­
ration,38 can be described as a celebration of, and an elaboration 
on, the famous fusion of law and equity as well as the prevalence 
given to one (and only one) of such two strands of jurisprudence— 
namely, that in matters of conflict or variance between the rules of 
law and the rules of equity, “equity shall prevail.”39  For Johnson, 
Wilkes replicates—en miniature—the same “epic struggle between 
the regimes of law and equity” which has been said to characterize 
the “grand history of Anglo-American law.”40  In a world of con­
stant, pervasive change with near infinite stochastic variation, rigid 
rules of law are of limited value and reach.  In contrast, rules of 
equity (including rules of fiduciary duty) endure by taking into ac­
count the inevitable flux and variety in firm relationships and by 
formulating dynamic and elastic standards of fairness which require 
courts to measure and balance rival interests and to, thus, temper 
the static application of universal rules of law. Professor Johnson 
points out that this statism-dynamism dichotomy is particularly pro­
nounced in the governance of closely held corporations where dif­
ferences in opinion can be—and, over time, often will be—both 
pervasive and recurrent.  Such differences not only affect the 
clashes between the minority’s reasonable investment expectations 
and the majority’s prerogatives of how to run the business best. 
They transcend, by necessity, into the legal realm and replicate into 
37. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson, Separation and the Function of Corporation Law, 2 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 141, 147 (2005) (“The point is that markets encourage a manage­
ment and governance structure that fits the corporation’s business.  Corporate law has 
nothing to add to the process.”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Vulnerability and Efficiency (of 
What?), 2 BERKELEY  BUS. L.J. 153, 159 (2005) (“Law has its limits.”); Robert B. 
Thompson, Corporate Law Criteria: Law’s Relation to Private Ordering, 2 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 95, 99 (2005) (“[L]aw defers to other regulators of human behavior when . . . 
alternative regulators have a relative advantage. . . . Law is humble.”). 
38. Johnson, supra note 12. R 
39. See Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 25(11) 
(“[I]n all matters . . . in which there is any conflict or variance between the Rules of 
Equity and the Rules of the Common Law with reference to the same matter, the Rules 
of Equity shall prevail.”); see also Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contempo­
rary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 475-76 (2003) (describing the deconstruction of 
the historic separation between common law courts and equity courts in England, the 
procedural merger of law and equity jurisprudence in the English High Court of Justice, 
and the equity-favoring conflict rule stated above between the substantive principles of 
both law and equity, all as effected by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875). 
40. Main, supra note 39, at 429. 
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differences of opinion on how to best address and reconcile such 
clashes in interests.  Here, Wilkes achieves the best-possible equi­
librium: it affirmed the centrality of Donahue’s strict fiduciary duty 
of loyalty and good faith among shareholders of a closely held cor­
poration while establishing a principled, standard-based balancing 
test, which prevents majorities from unjustly using lawfully-exer­
cised corporate power to create unfairness and harm to minority 
investors. 
The contribution of Mark Loewenstein, Wilkes v. Springside 
Nursing Home, Inc.: An Historical Perspective,41 focuses on yet an­
other realm which is part of the ambience of the Wilkes decision: 
the court which wrote the decision. First, Loewenstein carefully 
puts the precedential support for Wilkes’s predecessor, Donahue, 
under his legal microscope and concludes that “the supporting au­
thority for the holding in Donahue was weak, at best.”42  Indeed, 
Massachusetts precedent at the time clearly suggested that share­
holders in a closely held corporation were not standing in a fiduci­
ary relationship to one other.  Likewise, as Professor Loewenstein 
explores in detail, Wilkes “rested on a thin reed” of precedential 
support.43  The decision can thus be described as both radical and a 
clean break from the Massachusetts corporate law that preceded it. 
But such break does not come as a surprise to Loewenstein—he 
simply points us to the very court which decided Wilkes.  Directing 
our ambience-oriented attention to the jurists who wrote the opin­
ions in Donahue and Wilkes, Chief Justice G. Joseph Tauro for the 
former and his successor, Chief Justice Edward J. Hennessy for the 
latter opinion, Loewenstein discusses the structural changes 
brought to the Massachusetts appellate court system, including the 
installation of a completely new interim appellate court structure, 
which significantly freed up the workload of its highest court. Thus, 
he situates the radicalism of the decisions (when compared to what 
came before them) in the larger context of a progressive, activist 
and also properly-resourced Supreme Judicial Court charged, by 
default, with overseeing a necessary and fundamental moderniza­
tion of many aspects of Massachusetts state law during an era of 
unprecedented societal metamorphosis. 
Finally, after discussing the respective contextual fabrics of 
people, equity, and court involved in Wilkes, Robert Thompson in 
41. Loewenstein, supra note 33. R 
42. See id. 
43. Id. 
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Allocating the Roles for Contracts and Judges in the Closely Held 
Firm44 looks at Wilkes’s ambience from an equally important, addi­
tional angle: Donahue and Wilkes are at the very center of a funda­
mental reorientation within the American corporate law with 
regard to the role of private-party contracting on the one hand and 
judicial intervention based on an investor’s status as minority par­
ticipant in a closely held corporation on the other hand.45  The driv­
ing force behind such reorientation were not courts but legal 
academics.  In the decades after World War II, academic scholars 
like F. Hodge O’Neal and George Hornstein zeroed in on the pre­
dicament of minority investors in the closely held corporation and 
pointed out that the available instrumentarium of American corpo­
rate law for the governance of the corporate entity applied indis­
criminately to both publicly held and closely held entities—and, in 
doing so, applied with discriminating effect to oppressed minority 
shareholders in the closely held business. Thompson describes the 
complex structural predicament of the minority shareholder to be 
solved as well as the menu of possible solutions available in order to 
remedy such predicament.  He reminds us that the understanding of 
the predicament and its solutions was already meticulously devel­
oped pre-Donahue/Wilkes—namely, by corporate scholars, in par­
ticular, by O’Neal in his landmark treatises.46  Thus, Professor 
Thompson provides us with yet another facet of Wilkes’s ambience: 
once the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court started digging (by 
freeing itself from business-judgment-rule inflicted, judicial defer­
ence for corporate business decisions in the closely held corpora­
tion context), the mine for extracting a practicable and fair legal 
solution had already been laid and made operational by the com­
prehensive study of the majority-minority agency problem in the 
44. Thompson, supra note 6, at 369 n.1. R 
45. The utilization of status-based solutions (i.e., fiduciary duties) over contract-
based solutions (i.e., shareholder agreements—whether actually used or not) in Dona-
hue and Wilkes can, thus, be recognized as a reversal of Sir Henry Sumner Maine’s 
famous finding in 1861 that the history and evolution of English law—in terms of legal 
anthropology—are best understood as a movement from status (as the controlling fea­
ture of interrelations in primitive communities) to contract (as a characteristic and key 
determinant of relationships in progressive, developed societies). See SIR HENRY SUM­
NER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, 
AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 168 (London J. Murray 1861). 
46. F. HODGE O’NEAL, CLOSE  CORPORATIONS (1958); F. HODGE O’NEAL, 
CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1971); F. HODGE O’NEAL & JOR­
DAN  DERWIN, EXPULSION OR  OPPRESSION OF  BUSINESS  ASSOCIATES: SQUEEZE-OUTS 
IN A SMALL ENTERPRISE (1961); F. HODGE O’NEAL, “SQUEEZE OUTS” OF MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS (1975). 
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closely held firm in legal academia.  Unsurprisingly then,47 by my 
count Donahue quotes no less than thirteen different academic 
sources (including works by O’Neal and Hornstein) for authority in 
support of its special treatment given to closely held corporations— 
to which count Wilkes quotes fifteen additional academic works as 
secondary authority.  Finally, Thompson also bridges our focus to 
the legacy of Donahue and Wilkes and to the application of their 
combined doctrinal value to limited liability companies in the 
twenty-first century. 
Which brings us to the second group of contributions 
presented at the Symposium.  These articles concentrate, in one 
way or another, on what can be termed the internal and external 
legacy of Wilkes.48  The latter form of legacy (represented in the 
contributions by Deborah DeMott and Larry Ribstein) positions 
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. in relief with, and investi­
gates its doctrinal reach for the continuing development of minority 
protection mechanisms in, related areas of business law—namely, 
the employment-at-will doctrine as well as the emergence of the 
consensual, unincorporated limited liability company. The remain­
ing contributions—revolving around internal legacy claims of 
Wilkes (Daniel Kleinberger, Benjamin Means, and Douglas 
Moll)—each examine aspects of the doctrinal and practical sound­
ness, persuasiveness as well as overall fairness and justice of the 
judicial tools developed in Wilkes and made available to oppressed 
shareholder minorities in the closely held corporation.49 
Daniel Kleinberger’s position on the legacy of Wilkes in Dona­
hue’s Fils Aı̂né: Reflections on Wilkes and the Legitimate Rights of 
47. However, what is remarkable (if not surprising) about this and, thus, notewor­
thy is that common law judges usually seem to have a significantly lesser “appetite” for 
expressly quoting prior academic work as secondary authority relevant to solving the 
legal issue in question when compared with their colleagues in civil law jurisdictions. 
See, e.g., Basis S. Markesinis, A Matter of Style, 110 L. Q. REV. 607, 608-09 (1994). 
48. This second set of articles spans the presentations made during the two re­
maining panels at the Conference. Daniel Kleinberger, Benjamin Means, & Douglas 
Moll, Panel 3: Wilkes and the State of Fiduciary Duties (Oct. 15, 2010); Deborah De-
Mott & Larry Ribstein, Panel 4: Beyond “Corporate” Law (Oct. 15, 2010).  In addition 
to the panels, the Conference included a keynote speech delivered by the Honorable 
Francis X. Spina, Associate Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, on 
“The Amicus: Friend in Need.” 
49. Obviously, this examination—focused on the internal cohesion of Wilkes’s 
legacy and precedent—continues to this day within the judicial system itself. See, e.g., 
Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076 (Mass. 2006) (defining freeze-outs as majority-in­
flicted frustrations of the minority’s reasonable expectations of benefit from firm own­
ership and limiting frozen-out minority’s remedies for a breach of fiduciary duty to 
those that are—and only are—proportional to the breach). 
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Selfish Ownership50 is that the decision evidences ingenuity, if not, 
geniality in its practicable and equitable, multi-tiered balancing ap­
proach which, in conjunction with its burden-shifting mechanism, 
allows us to distinguish even the difficult cases of legitimate major­
ity shareholder control from those of (borderline) minority share­
holder oppression.  For Kleinberger, fiduciary duties among co­
owners of closely held businesses are essentially “schizoid”—a term 
by which he means that such owners cannot be in a classic fiduciary 
relationship owing absolute, i.e., undivided loyalty to the party pro­
tected by the fiduciary obligation.51  Rather, co-owners of the 
closely held firm are simultaneously fiduciary obligee and fiduciary 
obligor.  Thus, each co-owner must have some right to pursue self-
interest.  It follows that, in many close disputes among the co-own­
ers, each side must be, in part, “right” and, in part, “wrong” so that 
both sides can justifiably put some blame at each other’s doorstep 
for frustrating (at least, to some extent) their respective investment 
expectations.  As Professor Kleinberger further explains, in such a 
situation, a universal all-or-nothing rule would consistently produce 
sub-optimal outcomes.  Hence, the “genius”52 of the inevitable bal­
ancing approach prescribed in Wilkes and the superiority of its tri­
partite balancing test in which each successive step or layer 
constitutes a fallback safety valve to further control for, and finesse 
the weighing and balancing of firm participant interests on the im­
mediately preceding step.  Consequently, Wilkes is not only alive 
and well in Massachusetts, it is a sound doctrinal and practical con­
tribution to the law of closely held businesses which fares signifi­
cantly better when compared to the single-layer oppression tests 
based on a determination of reasonable investor expectations as are 
utilized in many jurisdictions outside of Massachusetts. 
Benjamin Means’s contribution, The Vacuity of Wilkes,53 
presents an interesting juxtaposition to Kleinberger’s analysis and 
assessment of the Wilkes legacy.  Means argues that the pragmatism 
of Wilkes in offering reliable solutions to majority-minority share­
holder oppression/freeze-out scenarios has significant shortcom­
ings—both, descriptively and normatively.  He starts out by 
agreeing that Wilkes must have done something right if it managed 
to establish an “outsized influence on the development of a robust, 
50. Kleinberger, supra note 27. 
51. Id. 
52. See id. 
53. Means, supra note 25. 
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fiduciary-based response to shareholder oppression nationwide.”54 
But, with closer and more skeptical scrutiny, Professor Means finds 
that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court “skimped” a little in 
telling us all there is to tell.  What constitutes “legitimate” in a busi­
ness purpose for the majority’s actions? What constitutes “less 
harmful” in a “reasonably available” alternative course of action in 
order for the minority to avail itself the protective reach of the fidu­
ciary duty notwithstanding the legitimate business purpose demon­
strated by the majority?  Obviously, all of these remaining inquiries 
are matters of degree55 and, for Means, the process of their deter­
mination is left unsatisfactorily open in Wilkes.  Or, as he points out 
more forcefully and elegantly: “the Wilkes test is vacuous.”56  One 
way to fill the gaps and, thus, to improve upon Wilkes, would be to 
develop more fully a theory of reasonable shareholder expectations 
as (at least) a threshold inquiry for judicial intervention.  Here, 
courts would ask first whether the majority action is violative of a 
shared understanding among the shareholders, i.e., of their actual 
bargain.  And, from Means’s perspective, Massachusetts’s signature 
approach to cases of shareholder oppression under Wilkes already 
includes the necessary DNA for such a more bargained-focused ap­
proach—namely, to graft a well-developed (general and specific, 
i.e., bargained-for) reasonable-expectations analysis onto Wilkes’s 
solid roots57 in order to differentiate mere opportunistic majority 
behavior from oppressive majority conduct. 
54. See id. 
55. Cf. Martin v. Peyton, 158 N.E. 77, 80 (N.Y. 1927) (“As in other branches of 
the law, a question of degree is often the determining factor.”). 
56. See Means, supra note 25. 
57. As is already underway as a refining judicial development in Massachusetts. 
See, e.g., O’Brien v. Pearson, 868 N.E.2d 118, 129 (Mass. 2007) (finding that the minor­
ity shareholder-plaintiff of a closely held corporation had not “shown with reasonable 
certainty that he suffered compensable damages as a result of the defendants’ breach” 
under the Brodie reasonable-expectation test for breach-remedy proportionality; supra 
note 49); Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076, 1082 (Mass. 2006) (“[T]he remedy for the 
defendants’ breach of fiduciary duty is one that protects the plaintiff’s reasonable ex­
pectations of benefit from the corporation and that compensates her for their denial in 
the past.  An evidentiary hearing is appropriate to determine her reasonable expecta­
tions of ownership; whether such expectations have been frustrated; and, if so, the 
means by which to vindicate the plaintiff’s interests.”); Merola v. Exergen Corporation, 
668 N.E.2d 351, 354 (Mass. 1996) (“[A]lthough the plaintiff invested in the stock of 
Exergen with the reasonable expectation of continued employment, there was no gen­
eral policy regarding stock ownership and employment, and there was no evidence that 
any other stockholders had expectations of continuing employment because they pur­
chased stock.”); see also Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 816 (Mass. 2009) (stating, 
in the LLC context, that “[a] breach of fiduciary duty through a freeze-out also occurs 
when the reasonable expectations of a shareholder are frustrated” (emphasis added)). 
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In Of Donahue and Fiduciary Duty: Much Ado About . . . ?,58 
Douglas Moll guides us all the way back to the main source.  If we 
are, indeed, talking legacy here, then we should remind ourselves 
where the tectonic paradigm shift for shareholder oppression cases 
in Massachusetts actually occurred—viz., in Donahue v. Rodd Elec­
trotype Co.  It is in Donahue where we find the fiduciary duty first 
recognized which has henceforth served as the conceptual cleavage 
tool for purposes of differentiating between legitimate control and 
unlawful oppression.  It is Donahue’s inter-jurisdictional appeal and 
reach that is responsible for the now (almost) universal recognition 
that closely held corporations, because of their distinct internal gov­
ernance structure and because of their investors’ more intimate in­
vestment relations and expectations, warrant a different legal 
treatment from the one-size-fits-all rules of corporation statutes 
targeted mostly at the publicly held entity as a default of regulatory 
prescription.  Moll thoroughly reexamines all of the puzzle pieces 
that make up Donahue and finds that some of the pieces—or 
changes of the law with which Donahue and its progeny is routinely 
credited—may not be changes from the pre-Donahue corporate law 
at all.  As he describes in detail, traditional corporate law already 
recognized shareholder-to-shareholder fiduciary duties and, for ex­
ample, reigned in on disproportionate awards of de facto dividends. 
However, he also finds that other legal strategies employed by 
Donahue clearly speak to its changing of the law by instituting a 
novel playing-field for majority-minority interaction within the 
closely held corporate firm.  Those legal strategies include the pro­
tection of employment and management rights of investors, even in 
the absence of any de facto-dividend improprieties, and the con­
scious judicial sidestepping and dilution of the courts’ traditional 
application of the business judgment rule, i.e., of the well-honed 
tool of conventional corporate law used to exercise judicial defer­
ence (and, thus, to avoid judicial second-guessing) with regard to 
the substantive propriety of corporate business decisions (including, 
of course, majoritarian employment and management decisions). 
Accordingly, Professor Moll concludes that Donahue and its prog­
eny not only recognized the specific and systemic vulnerabilities of 
minority shareholders in closely held corporations, the Massachu­
setts decisions also fundamentally changed the law in that they far 
exceeded any built-in pliability of traditional corporate law rules for 
58. Moll, supra note 8. R 
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purposes of addressing the minority shareholders’ plight in the 
closely held firm. 
Turning our spotlight now to what has been described earlier as 
the external legacy of Wilkes, Deborah DeMott in her contribution 
Investing in Work: Wilkes as an Employment Law Case59 immedi­
ately elaborates on one of the key findings by Moll and on such 
finding’s doctrinal impact on a related field of business law.  A fidu­
ciary duty of utmost loyalty and good faith owed to a minority 
shareholder and a simultaneously existing relationship of employ­
ment at-will between the closely held corporation and such minor­
ity shareholder inevitably must be at odds, and regularly come into 
conflict, with each other.  Indeed, as DeMott argues, both rules can 
be seen as “sticky” default rules because either normatively 
(whether deviations are permitted by law) or empirically (whether 
deviations are negotiated by the parties when permitted by law) we 
mostly seem to stick with those rules. The obvious question, then, 
is: which rule shall prevail this time?60  One way of reading Wilkes’s 
legacy and effect on the employment-at-will doctrine is that such 
doctrine yields to the irreducible core of mandatory law which Don­
ahue and Wilkes created in the form of a fiduciary duty.  In other 
words, the operation of employment at-will is only permitted as 
long as such operation aligns with a majority-legitimizing balancing-
test outcome under Wilkes.  Thus, an at-will termination is neither 
wrongful per se nor rightful per se.  The determination depends en­
tirely on the application of the Wilkes test.  As a doctrinal result, 
however, Wilkes is a just-cause amelioration of employment at-will 
and, though never a complete bar to a minority’s successful termi­
nation at-will, ousts the default rule of at-will employment.  Profes­
sor DeMott further explains how subsequent Massachusetts 
decisions have allowed shareholders in the closely held corporation 
to narrow, by explicit agreement, the scope of conduct to which 
their fiduciary duties apply.  Accordingly, Wilkes itself must be seen 
as a (partial) default rule, i.e., it replaces one default rule (employ­
ment at-will) with another default rule (a partially yielding fiduciary 
duty as it concerns corporate employment—for example, under an 
employment agreement that specifically permits both parties to ter­
minate without cause).  Thus, it is the actual bargain of the share­
holders—translated into reasonable expectations for purposes of 
determining oppression/freeze-out—which interlocks employment 
59. DeMott, supra note 13. R 
60. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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at-will and fiduciary duty and allows both rules to align (if not, to 
collapse into each other).  Yet, in the absence of an actual bargain 
which would work around Wilkes and would situate corporate em­
ployment outside of the realm of general and specific investment 
expectations of a particular shareholder, Wilkes carries the day and 
prevails. 
In the final contribution to this Symposium Issue, Close Corpo­
ration Remedies and the Evolution of the Closely Held Firm,61 Larry 
Ribstein brings us back to the contract-status divide, already dis­
cussed by Thompson in particular,62 which bipartitions the formula­
tion of remedial legal approaches to minority oppression scenarios 
in the closely held firm.  Ribstein positions Wilkes’s legacy in the 
larger context of the closely held “firm”—irrespective of how its 
“firm-ishness” translates into a separate, legally recognized aggre­
gation/entity63—and then traces the evolutionary progression and 
coming of age of the law’s translative efforts from “firm” to “legal 
construct”—as well as Wilkes’s due place in such efforts’ history— 
on a three-stage continuum from the small firm’s infancy (the gen­
eral partnership), via its adolescent identity crisis (the closely held 
corporation), to its final reach of adulthood and, perhaps, even ma­
turity within the law of business organizations (the limited liability 
company).  Thus, when we refocus on Wilkes and its legacy, Profes­
sor Ribstein finds the decision to fall firmly into the interim stage of 
evolution, i.e., the closely held firm in crisis. Wilkes constitutes a 
temporary, though important, but, ultimately, unhappy structural 
compromise for the efficient bundling of investor objectives and ex­
pectations in the closely held firm.  What the judicial intervention in 
Wilkes accomplished (other than to allow for a judicial re-writing of 
the small-firm investors’ actual bargain in order to rescue them 
from their imperfect advance planning) was to create a momentum 
for further evolution and change in the law of closely held firms 
which has accumulated in the triumph of contract, thus, bargaining, 
thus, law paradigms over those rooted in status, thus, fiduciary duty, 
thus equity paradigms.  Today, it is the limited liability company 
that has evolved as “a robust contracting platform”64 which helps 
closely held firm investors—taking their limits of foresight, i.e., 
their “bounded rationality” into account—to avoid the uncertain­
ties of judicially-structured interventions created by closely held 
61. Ribstein, supra note 8. R 
62. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
63. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
64. See Ribstein, supra note 8. R 
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corporation cases like Donahue and Wilkes.  Ribstein further de­
scribes how future improvements, in particular, in the form of well-
tailored statutory judicial dissolution remedies as well as better con­
tracting technology (aimed at optimizing (i) statutory defaults; (ii) 
the counseling and documentation of investors’ bargaining in the 
face of complexity and stochastic uncertainty; and (iii) the private 
adjudication of intra-firm disputes), can effectively complement and 
supplement the contract paradigm in its central investment-struc­
turing role in the limited liability company. 
* * *  
The following nine articles, both individually and collectively, 
are a fantastic kaleidoscope and tribute to the intricate and elabo­
rate balancing act that is Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 
Each of the articles, in its respective ways, describes some part of 
the multi-faceted, multi-layered, and multi-dimensional dichoto­
mies—including statism vs. dynamism; law vs. equity; judicial defer­
ence vs. judicial activism and second-guessing; contract vs. status; 
and selfish ownership vs. loyalty—which Wilkes carefully and in 
“one fell swoop” had to bridge, synthesize, and reconcile in order to 
give appropriate relative weight and credence to each of the under­
lying dialectic interests involved.  Not getting the balance right 
would most likely have guaranteed the decision’s quick descent into 
jurisprudential oblivion.  That this Issue of the Western New En­
gland Law Review instead celebrates the decision (roughly) thirty-
five years after it was released into a world of constant judicial and 
academic reconsideration, affirmation, and improvement (or, per­
haps, eventual empirical falsification and legal abolition), boldly il­
lustrates that Wilkes must have gotten much of the balancing right. 
Each of the following articles demonstrates that Wilkes is truly a 
judicial gem and masterpiece.  Granted, it does not achieve perfect 
balance.  But perfect balance—perfect harmony among competing, 
dynamic interests—is a logical impossibility. Wilkes, therefore, de­
serves all of its praise and has endured over three-and-a-half de­
cades because it is a masterpiece of a second-best solution (or a 
second-best optimum)65 with regard to the problem of the op­
pressed minority’s plight in the closely held corporation. 
65. A so-called “second-best solution” or “second-best optimum” in the theory of 
welfare economics describes the remaining, next-best optimal outcome that can be 
achieved under existing conditions after a constraint has been introduced that prevents 
the attainment of one of the optimality conditions of the economic model (which, in 
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itself, is necessary for the attainment of a Paretian optimum within the same model). 
Peter B ̈ohm, Second Best, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 280, 
280 (2008). In order to still achieve a “second-best solution,” i.e., an optimum subject 
to such constraint, some, if not, all of the other Paretian optimum conditions also need 
to be departed from. See Richard G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory 
of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 11-12 (1956), reprinted in READINGS IN  SO­
CIAL WELFARE: THEORY AND POLICY 47, 47-48 (Robert E. Kuenne ed. 2000); see also 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 250 n.6 (1999); B ̈ohm, supra, at 280-84. In a similar vein to this char­
acterization of Wilkes as a second-best solution, Professor Means argues that the appar­
ent normative contradiction in Wilkes’s recognition of a majority shareholders’ right of 
“selfish ownership” on the one hand and a duty of “utmost loyalty” owed to minority 
shareholders on the other hand can be explained by a theory of value pluralism in 
which economic efficiency is not the sole value objective, but is also commensurable 
with other value objectives—for example, the fairness and legitimacy of intra-corporate 
decision-making processes among majority and minority owners. See Means, supra 
note 25. 
